Reposted January 30th, 2014
The Usual Forces, With Surprising Results
Javier Corrales is the John E. Kirkpatrick 1951 professor of political science at Amherst College.
January 29, 2014
The
expansion of L.G.B.T. rights in Latin America has followed a storyline
that is similar to the expansion of civil rights more generally across
the globe, but with some twists. The key forces include rising incomes,
social movements, political parties and conservative actors. But in the
politics of gay rights in Latin America, these forces have defied
expectations.
Gay rights in Latin America have expanded the most in countries
whose incomes are highest, namely Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and
Mexico. This much was predictable. Yet high income has been neither
sufficient nor necessary. Not-so-rich Ecuador established same-sex civil
unions constitutionally, whereas the very rich Venezuela and Trinidad
and Tobago have dismal records on gay rights.
We know that when social movements are strong, widespread and
committed to human rights for all, they help push for political rights.
This too helps explain the legislative successes of those five
high-income countries, home to some of the strongest social movements in
the region.
However, social movements are also strong in Bolivia, Colombia, Costa
Rica and Peru, and activists in these countries are having trouble
expanding L.G.B.T. rights. What seems to make a difference,
therefore, is not so much the strength of social movements, but rather,
whether they forge strong ties with national-level political parties. In
Chile, for instance, gay rights groups, despite their commitment to the
left, worked closely with the center-right ruling party to promote the
country’s first hate crime law.
It is not enough to look at the forces pushing for change. Barriers
are also important, and in Latin America, as elsewhere, the most
important barriers against L.G.B.T. rights are posed by religious
groups. Where religious groups have strong ties to political parties,
legislative progress for L.G.B.T. rights suffers. Sometimes it’s the
Catholic Church that is closely tied to a party (e.g., Conservatives in
Colombia); sometimes it’s the Protestant right (as in the United States
and many English-speaking Caribbean countries); sometimes it’s both (as
in Central America). Even in presumably revolutionary Cuba and
Nicaragua, the ruling parties strengthened their ties with the Catholic
Church hierarchy in the 2000s, and this is one reason they have lagged
behind on L.G.B.T. rights. Civil rights in general often depend in
upholding the separation of church and state, but in the politics of gay
rights, the separation of church and party is just as vital.
Even within the five high-income countries, religious groups have
strong ties with at least one party in Chile, Mexico and Brazil, which
explains why L.G.B.T. legislation in these countries is less sweeping
than in Argentina and Uruguay. In those two cases, the separation of
church and party is the norm, and the type of Catholic practice is less
fundamentalist; these nations’ Catholics attend church less often and
are less opposed to same-sex marriage than Catholics elsewhere generally
are.
Parties in Latin America could do more. They could encourage more
politicians to come out, for instance. Even in the very pro-gay
Argentina, openly gay politicians are rare, and this perpetuates a
culture of complacency. Until parties transform themselves, they will
only push for L.G.B.T. rights based on the allies they get. The more
they align themselves with the progressive social movements, and less
with religious groups, the more they can be counted on to bring about
pro-gay change.